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Introduction
Terrorism today is a complex phenomenon. Threats planned by al
Qaeda, inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), organized by
revolutionaries, or conducted by lone wolves associated with a number of
single-issue groups dominate the news. By its nature, terrorism has ranged
from attacks with knives, bombs, firearms, vehicles and the evolving
technologies of the day. In the past fifty years, aircraft and terrorism have
been frequently linked. Understanding the threat of terrorism and the
emerging targets of terrorism is a vital component of public sociology.
Since the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacking of
airliners in 1968 (Saenz 2016), aviation has been a focal point for domestic
and international terrorism. Initially, these acts were designed to free
prisoners held by a host country or they were for ransom to fund further
political goals and terrorism. In some cases, such as the infamous D.B.
Copper affair, it was purely for profit as a criminal act. However, with the
1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, direct attacks
on aviation as surrogate targets for an enemy emerged. This escalation of
aviation terrorism eventually resulted in the use of captured airliners as
weapons of significant and symbolic destruction and the tragic events of
September 11, 2001. Thus, in just over 50 years, aviation became an
increasing fertile and frequent environment for terrorism.
The evolution of aviation terrorism has been marked by not only a
greater loss of lives, but also significant economic and political
consequences. In response to these threats, aircraft have been modified to
strengthen cockpits and cockpit doors, rear loading stairways have been
removed and anti-missile defenses have been incorporated in some highprofile planes. Cockpit personnel have been armed and undercover
security personnel, specifically U.S. Air Marshalls, are now commonplace
on many commercial carriers. Operating policies and training have been
adjusted, or in some cases, completely re-engineered to address potential
threats. On the ground, airport security has been improved with greater
perimeter security, worker, passenger and cargo/baggage screening. In
addition, new and more complex security protocols have been mandated by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security
Agency (TSA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and a number of
international organizations, in response to increasingly sophisticated or
innovative tactics or technologies employed by practitioners of terrorism.
However, the reactive nature of counterterrorism in commercial aviation
creates an ongoing dilemma between security and significant economic and
social/legal costs to a society.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 were designed not only to inflict
massive casualties and damage the targets selected, but also to
symbolically challenge a nation and its sense of international superiority
(Matusitz 2015). In addition, this attack was designed to damage both
global security and the U.S. economy (Price and Forrest 2009). Just as a
result of this one event, the aviation industry experienced a direct loss of
$330 million per day, not including the losses to related industries (Kumar
et. al. 2003, 2).
In response to terrorist threats to commercial aviation, numerous
federal and international agencies and organizations seek to address the
flaws and weaknesses within the field of aviation security. However, as the
industry increases security and hardens the environment in response to
terrorist threats, the asymmetrical nature of terrorism encourages its
practitioners to seek alternative targets. As the pendulum of prevention has
increased within the field of commercial aviation, the field of general aviation
(GA) may become the next environment for terrorist activity.
The Aviation Environment
Since 1903, the U.S. has been at the forefront aviation. From the first
manned, powered flight by the Wright brothers to the advanced flying
weaponry of today, America has been fascinated with flight. This fascination
has led to a rapid and continuous expansion of airports and airfields, as well
as a national air system that is both flexible and surprisingly available to the
general public.
The U.S. supports the greatest number of airports in the world.
Roughly half of the world’s airports and nearly two-thirds of the world’s
busiest airports reside within U.S. borders. There are over 19,000 landing
areas in the U.S., spanning the range of grass landing strips, helipads,
seaplane bases, and the more traditional paved runways (Wensveen 2016,
139). The overriding majority of these landing areas are privately owned.
Of the 19,000+ landing areas, only about one-fourth are open for public use.
Ownership of public use airfields generally falls into one of two categories:
1) direct government ownership (municipal, county, or state), or 2)
independent public authorities (whose members are often public officials or
appointed by local governing bodies).
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has established four
general categories of airports in the National Plan of Integrated Airport
Systems (NPIAS). Commercial Service airports are public facilities which
offer scheduled service (such as Delta Air Lines) and enplane nearly 2.2
million passengers per day (FAA 2016). There are approximately 500 such

airports in the United States.
Cargo Service airports provide air
transportation of cargo only. Airports may be both a commercial and cargo
service airport. Reliever airports are general aviation airports which are
located in major metropolitan areas and have the capacity to off-load
commercial flight in times of distress. Finally, General Aviation airports
neither receive commercial service nor meet the Reliever airport criteria.
In addressing the threat of terrorism against public transportation, the
United States has committed a majority of its resources to aviation (Fagin
2006). The Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation
Safety Administration has, since 9/11, worked diligently to improve security
or to “harden” commercial airports against terrorist threats. Whereas al
Qaeda has continued efforts to disrupt commercial air service world-wide,
other groups, such as ISIS has directed or inspired its “soldiers” to attack
the individuals or “softer” targets (Clemons 2010). One such potential softer
target within the field of aviation security is general aviation (GA).
General aviation airports represent the second largest category of
airports and operate on a daily basis throughout the United States. There
are nearly 5,300 community airports in the U.S. which accommodate almost
a quarter of a million aircraft representing 77% of all air traffic (Carafano
2007, 1). Aside from the large metropolitan commercial airports, these
municipal airports are easily recognizable to the local citizenry. While many
have unique facilities and structures, nearly all have paved and lighted
runways and taxiways, as well as some form of services provided to the
aviators who use them. A typical general aviation airport contains at least
one paved runway of around 5,000 ft. in length, a “terminal” building, fueling
services (including fixed fuel tanks), lighting, communication radios,
navigational aids, and less frequently, a control tower manned by FAA Air
Traffic Controllers. On the whole, while GA airports are capable of receiving
and launching a wide range of aircraft, GA airports are not considered
terribly sophisticated operations (Bragdon 2008). In addition, general
aviation is a vibrant and expanding industry. It supports nearly 1.3 million
jobs, which represents just over 1 percent of U.S.GDP (Carafano 2007, 1).
Security Status at General Aviation Airports
Since its inception, the Transportation Security Agency has provided
significant and valuable direction to the nation’s large, commercial-use
airports. The combination of perimeter barriers, security, and screening
have become commonplace. While frequently considered a nuisance by
passengers, these security measures are increasingly tolerated and have
resulted in a higher level of security and safety at these large airports. The

same however, cannot be said about security at the remaining airfields
around the nation. In 2004, the TSA acknowledged that less attention had
been paid to security at GA airports and with help of a GA working group,
issued TSA Information Publication A-0002 “Security Guidelines for
General Aviation Airport Operators and Users”.
In many ways, the guidelines recommended in this document
mirrored those at major airports by targeting access, perimeter fencing, fuel
storage, signage, vehicle gate control, and lighting. Additional
recommendations centered on pilot training at these airports, noting that the
9/11 hijackings were perpetrated by pilots trained at small airport facilities.
Of note however, is the lack of mandate for any of these guidelines.
IP A-0002 clearly states that these guidelines are recommendations for
improving security at GA airports and are not regulatory in nature (TSA
2004, iii). The absence of mandates and regulations leave many experts
uneasy (Goldberg 2011). One of the principle concerns resulting from the
events of September 11, 2011 was the use of aircraft as offensive weapons.
The combination of size, range and fuel capacity of commercial airliners
provided terrorists with a destructive force, capable of being delivered from
within the U.S., to nearly anywhere in the host country and well beyond (e.g.
the Gulfstream G-V, has a range of over 6,500 miles). Today’s corporate
jets, most of which operate from General Aviation airports, have similar
characteristics as commercial airliners, but need much less runway length
to takeoff or land, making them prime candidates for future attacks. Due to
the lack of regulation revolving around GA security, these corporate jets are
often readily accessible to the public. Incredibly one can frequently walk
directly from their car in the parking lot, through the “terminal” and onto a
corporate jet with little, to no, scrutiny. With a limited number of the nearly
19,000 GA airports being staffed by either TSA or Customs agents, the
general-aviation industry is, for all intents and purposes, self-regulated.
To better illustrate this condition, the Georgia Airports Association
(GAA) recently conducted a survey of the ninety-one (91) airfields in the
state of Georgia that have paved runways of 5,000 feet or longer. A series
of security-related questions were posed to the airport leadership teams,
including the types and size of aircraft utilizing the field, the presence of
perimeter fencing, the use of passenger screening techniques and the use
of baggage screening processes. Sixteen (n=16) of the 91 airports
responded, for a response rate of nearly 18%. The results of the survey
support TSA’s concern over General Aviation airport security. Ninety-four
percent (94%) of the respondents indicated that mid-sized to large
corporate jets operate at their particular airport, while less than half (44%)
of those same airports instituted airfield perimeter fencing. In addition,

those same airports reported that only 7% (1 out of sixteen) utilized
passenger and/or baggage screening (GAA Survey 2016).
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Figure 1 – GAA Regional Airport Security Survey (2016)
In its 2004 report to the House of Representatives subcommittee on
Homeland Security, the General Accounting Office was critical of the current
state of security at General Aviation airports. The GAO report indicated that
it believed increased federal oversight of security measures at GA airports
was sorely needed. Their findings at that time noted “TSA and other federal
agencies have not conducted an overall systematic assessment of threats
to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to determine how to better prepare
against terrorist threats” (GAO 2004, 3). Additionally, the GAO found that
following the events of September 11, 2001, the TSA had “primarily focused
on strengthening the security of commercial aviation and meeting
associated congressional mandates” (GAO 2004, 24), leaving “general
aviation managers and aircraft owners [to] determine what security
measures they will use to protect their assets” (GAO 2004, 47). Finally, the
GAO noted that funding any security measures undertaken by GA airports
has been significantly inconsistent. In an audit of 31 general aviation
airports, the GAO found that in one case an airport manager had spent less
than $25 on security measures while another spent $3 million. Nearly a
third of the GA respondents reported that improvement funds came directly
out of airport revenues, while only 20% indicated that they had access to
federal grant money to pay for these improvements (GAO 2004, 47).
While Information Publication A-0002 has remained the backbone of
guidelines for security at GA airports, the TSA has recognized that
operations, technology, and potential threats have evolved since 2004 and
as a result, has proposed revising the current set of aviation regulations to
enhance security at GA airports. The proposed rule change impacts various

parts of 49 CFR and is known as the “Large Aircraft Security Plan (LASP)”
proposal. This proposal was submitted for public comment via the Federal
Register in 2008 and would require aircraft weighing over 12,500 lbs. to
undergo some of the same security checks that have up until now, been
reserved for large commercial aircraft. In addition, certain GA airports,
specifically those designated as “Reliever” airports or those operating
regularly scheduled service, would be required to meet several security
requirements associated with large “Commercial Service” airports. The
majority of the proposed security checks center on the aircraft itself; in
particular, who has authorized access to the cockpit, cabin and cargo area.
The regulation would also require operators to verify that passengers are
not on the “No Fly” and/or “Selectee” portions of the federal government's
consolidated terrorist watch list. Airport impact is much less, focusing
attention on training for certain personnel and record-keeping. The TSA
believes that these measures will minimize the vulnerability of aircraft being
used as weapons.
The negative reaction from a large portion of the GA industry to this
NPRM was swift and loud, particularly from industry associations (National
Business Aviation Association and General Aviation Manufacturing
Association), as well as aircraft owners and flight crews. The primary
criticism of the proposed CFR changes involved cost v. benefit and
government intrusion into private aviation practices. To many industry
followers, business aviation, a significant user of GA airports, is being hurt
by the additional security recommended by TSA. Business aviation “is
struggling to cope with new federal agencies indifferent to its needs while
attempting to maintain operational commitments to serve customers
efficiently” (Phillips 2002). The National Business Aviation Association
(NBAA) believes that voluntary action, including closer coordination
between local airport managers, not government intervention, is the best
course of action for GA airports when it comes to security measures (NBAA
2008).
The NBAA has taken a particularly strong stance against the NPRM
proposal. The association has actively worked towards reducing the effect
that the TSA policies have on general aviation (Wynbrandt 2011) and has
been lobbying Congress for relief (Lowe 2013). In response to the criticism
of TSA autonomy and concern by the greater GA community, Congress
passed House Bill H.R. 1204 “Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation
Act of 2013”, which permanently established the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee and formally structured a general aviation sub-committee. The
sub-committee has already provided the TSA with recommendations for
revising the 2004 Security Guideline document as well as provided

recommendations for revising the NPRM. The recommendations included
raising the definition of a “large aircraft” from 12,500 lbs. to 25,000-30,000
lbs., reducing the impacted GA airports. The TSA confirmed that the new
SNPRM will focus its attention on aircraft and not small airports (Lowe
2010).
SWOT Analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats)
A SWOT analysis of the current state of security at General Aviation
airports indicates that a number of issues and actions related to potential
terrorist threats require consideration.
Strengths – The strength of the current state of security at GA airports
emanates from the flexibility afforded by the TSA in IP A-0002 by only
providing recommendations as opposed to regulations. This allows each
airport and its operators to customize their security measures to better meet
their specific threats. In this case “one-size does not fit all”. Funds and effort
can be used more effectively and efficiently using this approach.
Weaknesses – The primary weaknesses of the current state stems from the
lack of significant regulation and mandate. Notwithstanding the benefits of
flexibility and customization, reality often dictates that where there is no
mandate (and little funding), organizations tend to “speak loader than they
act”. In other words, while these airports and their operators may take
security discussions seriously, when it comes time for execution, other
directives often get higher priority. As a result, very few appear to be taking
a strong position in favor of the TSA guidelines.
Opportunities – The opportunities to improve the security situation are only
limited by imagination and funding. Since the advent of security measures,
perpetrators have continued to be creative and “hit where the enemy isn’t”.
If terrorists can think of new ways around current security measures,
security experts can stay one step ahead provided they are thinking “outside
the box. Again, funding rises to the forefront of this concern. Additionally,
should the LASP or its derivative become law, it will add a level of security
by mitigating the threat of terrorists using corporate jets as weapons
(although certainly does not eliminate the possibility).
Threats - According to the GAO, several threats are real and current. Others
are lying in wait for the airports’ next moves. The principal threat emanates
from intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing among airports and

agencies. While the use of larger aircraft as a weapon is somewhat
mitigated by security protocols, the possibility still exists that they will once
again be a target for terrorists. Aircraft, regardless of size, can inflict
significant damage if directed at appropriate targets. And a new threat
exists, from Unmanned Aircraft Systems (or drones), as they can be easily
launched from GA airports. It is now recognized that at most GA airports,
there is currently little in the way of passenger or bag screening, virtually no
limits to access of ramps or aircraft, limited perimeter fencing and - even
more worrisome - very little funds available to alter this state (Price and
Forrest 2013).
The threat of the use of general aviation airplanes as a weapon is
obvious. However, there are a multitude of other potential threats
associated with general aviation. As previously identified in conjunction with
the 9/11 attacks, flight training of potential terrorists continues to exist even
though Federal Regulations have increased the scrutiny of potential
students (e-CFR 2008). In the past, general aviation frequently has been
associated with smuggling. Potentially, the access and availability of
general aviation may be an avenue for smuggling weapons, explosives or
even terrorists (Price and Forrest 2013). In addition, targeting general
aviation also would have significant economic impact on the business
community which relies heavily on it for timely travel and delivery of timesensitive materials. Across the nation, employment resulting from general
aviation totaled over 1.1 million jobs in 2013, and contributed nearly $219
billion to the nation’s economy (PWC 2015). By making General Aviation
airports potential targets for terrorist activities, broader and more expensive
security measures would be required, threatening their economic viability
while simultaneously producing the symbolic threat and presence of
terrorists, spread throughout America.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Historically, aviation terrorism focused on commercial aviation. The
visibility of previous attacks raised the level of social awareness and general
concern. The public is reminded of the threat every time the enter a major
airport and proceed through a number of layers of security. However,
should a terrorist group decide to once again use aviation for their vehicle
of terror, general aviation airports appear to be “soft targets” or prime
candidates from which to launch their plans and impact the fabric of
American society. The relative lack of security at this category of airports
affords creative minds a number of opportunities from which to exploit terror
as both a direct and indirect threat.

A renewed focus on several areas of concern could aid in remedying
a significant portion of the current threat risk. Among the first and potentially
most impactful solutions is to dictate and enforce perimeter fencing and gate
control. As an added measure of security, GA airports or FBO operators
should be required to designate a ramp security “officer” and provide that
officer with passenger “screening” processes such as questioning anyone
on the airport grounds as to their purpose. All employees and staff
members with access to the airport grounds should be badged and badges
should be visible at all times. Controlling access is not difficult or even
moderately expensive, but practice at commercial airports has shown that
it is effective.
Always an issue, funding for these programs could come directly
from FAA grant funding. Each GA airport is entitled to a certain share of
funding annually (around $150,000). Should the FAA make these steps
mandatory, each airport could use these funds to offset costs, and should
that be insufficient, the FAA could augment funding by channeling funds
designated for less important uses. Of course, that would require the FAA
to give some level of priority to this concern.
In the past decade, academe has recognized the potential terrorist
threat that exists with regard to the general aviation community. A number
of institutions have developed training programs in GA airport security. For
example, Waukesha County Technical College include the following topics
in their security-related training programs:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

How to recognize GA aircraft and facilities that could be used for
illegal purposes;
How to apply crime prevention through environmental design
concepts to GA airports;
Establishing an Airport Watch Program;
Establishing aircraft key control system;
Antitheft devices for GA aircraft;
Security signage and marking plans;
How to orient local law enforcement personnel to airport
environment and aircraft operations;
Creation of an airport security committee;
Creation of an emergency notification system;
National Incident Management System fundamentals;
How to create a business continuity plan;
Developing instruction detection, integrated security and CCTV
systems;

•

Troubleshooting airport security plans. (Price and Forrest 2013).

Aviation security is a risky venture. Since the early days of flying, it
has enjoyed a mass appeal, which makes aviation a great venue for terror.
Following the events of 9/11, the country took exceptional steps to reduce
the security risks at commercial use airports. With that avenue limited,
terrorists will almost certainly seek another route. To be sure that it doesn’t
begin at General Aviation airports, it is imperative that any threats
associated with this category of airport be given priority, and subsequently
minimized.
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